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Abstract 
 
 
The article presents an analysis of supplementary pension insurance in Slovenia and its 
subsequent effects on welfare, macroeconomic variables and pension fund deficit with a 
dynamic OLG general equilibrium model. It has been established that the volume of 
supplementary pension saving is insufficient at present in Slovenia to compensate the 
deterioration of rights from the first pension pillar. Not only is the participation in the 
(voluntary) second pillar insufficient, but especially the premia are too low. The macro-
economic consequences of introducing a fully-funded mandatory component of pension 
insurance would not be unfavourable. Increased pension saving reduces current consumption 
and increases the labour supply of active generations, but also increases the volume of 
disposable savings, so the increased investment may increase capital stock and production, 
which leads to an increase in economic growth and potential future consumption. Increased 
labour supply of insured persons would also lead to a higher volume of contributions for 
mandatory pension insurance, which would reduce the state pension fund deficit. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Economic sustainability of social security systems is under severe pressure 
nowadays due to ageing caused by decreasing fertility rate, increasing life expectancy, 
increasing share of recipients of social benefits, and decreasing share of active population 
(cf. OECD, 2000; European Commission, 2001). These are the reasons for anticipated 
increase of traditional social security benefits and introduction of new types of old-age 
insurance. Among key topics of social security in Slovenia is therefore the development of 
sustainable, efficient and fair system of funding social security in the environment of 
expected further ageing of the population. Special emphasis is being put on the pension 
system due to its weight in the system of public finances; therefore it is also the focus of 
our research. 
 
  Due to increasingly perceivable unfavourable demographic developments it became 
obvious in Slovenia in the 1990s that the former pension legislation will not be able to 
sustain the pressure. This became distinctly obvious in 1996, when the state pension fund 
needed additional financing from the central budget for the first time. This was enough to 
start intense preparations for the Slovenian pension reform, which was adopted in the form 
of the 1999 Pension and Disability Insurance Act (PDIA) and is being implemented from 1 
January 2000. With gradual implementation of the 1999 PDIA, the second pension pillar is 
becoming increasingly important on account of the first pension pillar. This means that 
people will become less dependent on the pension from the first pillar as soon as they 
retire. However, since the second pension pillar in mainly voluntary in Slovenia, there are 
reservations regarding whether the present amount of supplementary pension saving will 
be sufficient to compensate the deterioration of rights from the first pension pillar. 
 
  In the present analysis we are interested in the effects of introducing mandatory 
supplementary pension insurance in Slovenia on welfare of generations, macroeconomic 
categories and sustainability of public finances. The effects of mandatory second pillar 
shall then be compared to the effects of present (voluntary) supplementary pension saving. 
To achieve this, Slovenian economy is being analyzed with an overlapping-generations 
general equilibrium (OLG-GE) model, which is the most developed version of computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models. Namely, the model SIOLG 2.0 makes possible analysis 
of intra-generational and inter-generational redistribution effects of potential effects of 
different strategies of public financing in order to achieve sustainable long-term economic 
growth and social development. It also enables monitoring and anticipation of effects of 
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unfavourable demographic developments on the volume of social transfers to the 
population. 
 
  The outline of the article is as follows. In Chapter 2 a short description of the OLG 
general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy is presented, while the developments 
in the Slovenian pension system from the 1990s onwards are explained in some detail in 
Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 some of the simulation results of the model are presented, with 
special focus on supplementary pension insurance in Slovenia and its subsequent effects on 
welfare, macroeconomic variables and state pension fund deficit. In the final chapter we 
summarize the central findings of the article. 
 
Description of the OLG-GE Model of the Slovenian Economy 
 
  The model SIOLG 2.0 is a dynamic overlapping-generations general equilibrium 
model of the Slovenian economy, based on social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 
2000, data on demographic structure of the population, expected future demographic 
developments, characteristics of Slovenian households, and decomposition of households 
within generations (cf. Verbič et al., 2006; Verbič, 2007). The model has been developed 
with the very intention of analyzing the sustainability of the Slovenian public finances, 
though it can be used to analyze any part or any sector of the economy. 
 
  The starting points of the OLG-GE model are the life cycle theory of consumption 
by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman 
(1957), which are actually special cases of the more general theory of intertemporal 
allocation of consumption (Deaton 1992). Unlike in the Keynes’s theory of behaviour of 
consumption and savings, based only on current income, in the OLG-GE model 
consumption and savings are derived from intertemporal optimization behaviour and are 
therefore dependent on full lifetime income. In the simplest case of unchanged income 
until retirement (cf. Modigliani 1986), consumers save during their active lifetime and 
spend their savings after the retirement in order to maintain unchanged consumption. The 
retirement is therefore raison d’etre for saving. 
 
  Overlapping-generations general equilibrium models represent the pinnacle of 
dynamic CGE modelling. OLG-GE modelling was established and promoted by Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) and is based on detailed decomposition of the consumption side of 
the model. Namely, unlike in the Ramsey-type models the consumers live a finite length of 
time, but long enough to live at least one period with the next generations of consumers. 
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Determination of consumers by their birth cohort enables analysis of inter-generational 
effects, which makes OLG-GE models especially valuable for analysis of tax policies, 
pension policies and other social policies. 
 
  Dynamic general equilibrium model SIOLG 2.0 comprises not only the standard 
model structure of a national economy, but also the demographic block and the pension 
block, within the framework of which the first and the second pillar of the Slovenian 
pension system are being modelled. Since the model incorporates most of the 
contemporary techniques of the CGE modelling, the arrears in this field in Slovenia 
compared to the rest of the world have practically been eliminated. Namely, the model is 
build within the general algebraic modelling system (GAMS), which has become both 
most widely used programming language and most widespread computer software (Brooke 
et al. 1998) for construction and solving large and complex CGE models. 
 
  Within the GAMS framework, the dynamic general equilibrium model is written in 
Mathiesen’s (1985) formulation of the Arrow-Debreu (1954) equilibrium model, i.e. as a 
mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The key advantage of this formulation is the 
compact presentation of the general equilibrium problem, which is achieved by treating 
variables implicitly and thus significantly reducing the computation time for higher-
dimensional models. Namely, the mathematical program includes equalities as well as 
inequalities, where the complementarity slackness holds between system variables and 
system conditions (cf. Rutherford 1995a; Böhringer et al. 2003). Functions of the model are 
written in Rutherford’s (1995) calibrated share form; a reasonably straightforward 
algebraic transformation, which nevertheless considerably simplifies the calibration of the 
model (cf. Böhringer et al. 2003; Balistreri and Hillberry 2003). To solve the model, i.e. to 
achieve convergence, a recent version of the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson 2000) is 
used, which is renowned for its computational efficiency. 
 
  Consumers live in the model according to their expected length of life, i.e. their life 
expectancy at birth. Assuming that the life expectancy is approximately 80 years and that 
the active lifetime period starts at the age of 20, there are 60 generations in each period of 
the model. There is a new cohort of consumers born in each such period, thus increasing 
the population, while at the same time a number of consumers pass away and decrease the 
total population. Consumers are observed in five-year intervals within households, which 
maximize the expected lifetime utility subject to their income constraints, where one has to 
put out the need to save for retirement and to support children. Households are 
differentiated in the model according to year of birth, income and size; within each cohort 
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distinction is made between couple without children and nuclear family with two children 
on average, and five income profiles representing different income brackets. Consequently, 
there are ten versions of the model altogether, which facilitates analysis of intra-
generational effects of different economic policies. 
 
  The volume of labour and the labour productivity growth are given exogenously. 
Changes in wages are reflected in changes of the labour supply. Consumption of 
households with children is additionally corrected due to extra cost per child, where the 
children are born in the childbearing age of the woman or, to be precise, the household, i.e. 
in the age bracket of 20-40 years. In the first ten years after retirement the household is 
comprised of two persons and afterwards of one adult. Saving decisions of households 
affect investment decisions of firms in the capital markets and thus future production. The 
effects ascribed herein have recurrent effects on product market through decreasing prices 
and on labour market through higher productivity, leading to higher wages and finally 
higher income of households. Both effects can be analyzed with a dynamic OLG-GE 
model quite straightforwardly. 
 
  The perfect foresight assumption in the forward-looking model specification 
implies the ability of households to perform intertemporal optimization of the present value 
of entire future consumption. In other words, the consumers have full information at their 
disposal, adopt on average the right decisions and are familiar with future modifications of 
key economic indicators, which is the quintessence of rational expectations. They are able 
to anticipate new policies and to prepare themselves to future changes. The assumption of 
equilibrium in all markets and assumption of achieved sustainable economic growth enable 
analysis of different scenarios, which cause deviations from the reference growth path and 
changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators. This is especially important 
when analyzing social security, because it makes possible projecting the effects of 
demographic changes on the social security system. For this we have three variants of 
demographic projections available; the low variant combines lower fertility with lower life 
expectancy and lower net migration, while the high variant combines higher fertility with 
higher life expectancy and higher net migration than in the reference medium variant. 
   
 On the other hand, the assumption of perfect foresight is also valid for firms, which 
maximize profits in the environment of perfect competition. Technology is given by the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. The number of production 
sectors in the model is dependent on availability of the input-output table for the base year, 
which means that there are 60 sectors of the standard classification of activities (SCA) 
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available for discretionary aggregation. Government spending is dependent on economic 
growth and growth of the population, and is financed with revenues from personal income 
tax, capital income tax, value-added tax and import duties. Sources of revenue of the 
Slovenian system of public finances represent various possibilities of funding different 
economic policies in the simulation phase of the modelling. 
 
  The modelling of the first pension pillar was designed to capture the key pension 
system parameters that are usually the subject of modification within pension reforms. The 
emphasis is on the cash flow of the mandatory pension insurance institution, the 
relationship between the pension base and pensions, and the process of adjustment of 
pension growth with respect to wage growth. The modelling of the second pillar is focused 
on the implementation of the liquidity constraint. For this purpose the so-called total 
pension was introduced, representing the sum of the pension from the first and second 
pillars, where at every point households adjust the scope of their labour supply and their 
current consumption towards a target total pension. This creates a certain volume of 
supplementary pension saving, which can be treated as mandatory supplementary pension 
insurance, if the target total pension is defined at a level dissimilar to the reference level. 
 
  The dynamic general equilibrium model SIOLG 2.0 is closed using the 
Armington’s (1969) assumption of imperfect substitutability, where the commodities are 
separated by its source on domestic and imported products. Demand for imported products 
is derived from cost minimization criterion of firms and utility maximization criterion of 
consumers. As regards the export side of the model, domestically produced products are 
sold at home and abroad, but are nevertheless treated as imperfect substitutes. Slovenia is 
assumed to be a small open economy, implying that the changes in the volumes of imports 
and exports do not affect the terms of trade. International capital flows are endogenous, 
given the intertemporal balance of payments constraint. 
 
Representation of Developments in the Slovenian Pension System 
 
  The Republic of Slovenia inherited the legislation of its pension system, which was 
based on inter-generational contract and is therefore a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, 
from the former Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia splintered into newly independent countries 
at the beginning of the 1990s, transformation from the workers’ self-management to a 
modern market economy was initiated in Slovenia, thus requiring the formation of new 
markets and taking its rules into account. However, the consequences of bankruptcy of 
firms, economic recession and restructuring of the business sector, all resulting from 
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economic transformation, were being “solved” contemporaneously in order to preserve 
social sustainability by mass early retirement. 
   
  After Slovenia’s independence in 1991, the new pension legislation was adopted 
somewhat behind schedule in 1992, when the restructuring was for the most part already 
finished. Even the rise of retirement age was therefore not able to put the break on early 
retirement pressure. Because the price of additional years of service was low and therefore 
not consistent with the actuarial principles, purchase of additional years of service was a 
common phenomenon. Consequently, the increase in actual retirement age was modest and 
very close to minimum retirement age. The ratio between the number of insured persons 
and the number of pensioners has been relatively steady over the last decade (Stanovnik 
2002), although this stability is somewhat misleading for the new pension legislation 
introduced additional categories of insured persons1. 
 
  Legislative modifications adopted in 1992 are partially responsible also for the 
large increase of pension expenditure of the PAYG-financed state pension fund, i.e. the 
Institute for Pension and Disability Insurance (IPDI), in the same year. Namely, with the 
new Pension and Disability Insurance Act the IPDI was compelled to pay contributions for 
health insurance for pensioners, hence contributing at least one additional percentage point 
to the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP. After 1992 the pension expenditure, measured 
as percentage of GDP, somewhat stabilized at the level of 11 per cent. This could have 
been a sign of financial stabilization of the IPDI; however things took a drastic turn for the 
worse, as we will find out hereinafter. Until 1996 all extensive increases of pension 
expenditure were financed by increasing the pension contribution rate. As a result the (joint 
employer and employee) pension contribution rate ascended from 22.55 per cent of the 
gross wage in 1989 to 31 per cent of the gross wage in 1995. Finally, in 1996 the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia decided to lower the employer pension 
contribution rate from 15.5 per cent of the gross wage to 8.85 per cent of the gross wage in 
order to increase competitiveness of the Slovenian economy. 
 
  The year 1996 hence represent a decisive moment, since until then financially 
autonomous state pension fund demonstrated a deficit for the first time, which has after 
that been filled up every year until 2004 with the so-called “generalized” transfers from the 
central budget in order to maintain social stability. Transfers of funds from the central 
                                                 
1 Evident examples of introducing additional categories of insured persons are “voluntarily insured persons” 
and “unemployed persons receiving unemployment benefits” for whom the contributions are paid by the 
National Employment Office. 
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government budget to the IPDI indeed existed prior to 1996, but were only intended for 
financing additional obligations of the government, such as pensions of farmers, 
policemen, customs officers and combatants of the World War II. Now the government 
actually committed itself to partially finance pensions, which were primarily established on 
actuarial principles and were before 1996 entirely funded with contributions of the active 
population. Until the economic transformation relatively favourable pension figures 
become insupportable in just a few years. One should certainly adjoin that the effects of 
demographic changes on the social security system are yet to be observed in the 
subsequent years. 
 
  The decrease of employer pension contributions was thus a “suitable” occasion for 
the extreme measure of transfer funding of the pension system. The insolvency of the 
pension system therefore passed by unnoticed to the general public, but the consequences 
of the pension deficit can be seen in the structure of the Slovenian budget, where there are 
fewer funds available for investments and for research and development. Yet the economic 
situation is commonly not perceived to be so pessimistic. The fiscal position was relatively 
favourable for the whole time and certainly the most promising among the new EU 
member states; the budget deficit was relatively low in the last decade despite the difficult 
situation in the first years of economic transition, hence the public debt increased only 
moderately. 
 
  The problem, which has by that time drawn attention of economists of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was being properly addressed with the 
preparation of the White Paper on the subject in 1997, which led to the adoption of new 
PDIA in 1999. The implementation of this law started on 1 January 2000 and is to be 
finished in 2024. The pension system has become more complex than ever before; partially 
due to difficult negotiations in the government coalition, but mainly because of tiresome 
negotiations between management and labour (Stanovnik 2002). The main characteristic of 
the new pension legislation in comparison with the former legislation is path-dependency, 
which appears to be a universal feature of predominantly gradualistic reforms of the 
Slovenian economic system. In addition, the transitional periods are lengthy, so the actual 
values of parameters of the present three-pillar pension system in Slovenia converge only 
gradually to the final values. 
 
  Statutory retirement age under the 1999 PDIA, which guarantees insured persons 
retirement benefits, dependent only on completed years of service (without deductions), is 
63 years for men and 61 years for women. This criterion is to be increased from 58 years 
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and 6 months in 2000 by 6 months per annum for men and from 53 years and 4 months in 
2000 by 4 months per annum for women. However, an individual can retire already at the 
age of 58 and receives pension without deductions in case he or she fulfilled the full 
pension qualifying period, which is 40 years of service for men and 38 years of service for 
women. The transitional period terminates at the end of 2008 for men and at the end of 
2022 for women. Minimum pension qualifying period is still 15 years of service. The 
retirement age can be decreased for every born or adopted child, brought up and supported 
by the insured person at least for five years. 
 
  There is more consideration given in the 1999 PDIA to actuarial fairness for the 
system of incentives and disincentives was adopted in case of retirement before and after 
fulfilment of retirement eligibility criteria, respectively. Namely, for all insured persons 
without full pension qualifying period, retired before completed 63 (men) and 61 years of 
service (women), the pension adequately decreases for every month missing until the 
statutory retirement age. If, on the contrary, the insured pension remains employed after 
completed statutory retirement age and full pension qualifying period, the pension 
adequately increases for every month, completed after the statutory retirement age. 
Incentives and disincentives are to be added or subtracted 1.5 percentage points of accrual 
rate for every year of service added or missing, respectively. 
 
  The calculation of pensions is less favourable for insured persons under the 1999 
PDIA. Old-age pension is calculated from the pension base in per cent, depending on 
number of completed years of service; 35 per cent in case of men and 38 per cent in case of 
women for the first 15 years of service, and 1.5 per cent for each additional year of service 
irrespective of gender. Under the proviso that the insured person is not subjected to 
pension disincentives, the pension in case of full pension qualifying period amounts to 72.5 
per cent of pension base, instead of prior 85 per cent (1992 PDIA). Since the pension base 
under the 1999 PDIA is calculated out of best 18 consecutive years of service instead of 
prior best 10 consecutive years of service (1992 PDIA), the decrease in pensions is even 
higher. However, the most complex procedures of the 1999 pension legislation are 
revalorization of pension bases and indexation of pensions (cf. Stanovnik 2004). 
Revalorization of the pension base in the Slovenian pension system is a procedure of 
recalculating sources of pensionable income in the best 18 consecutive years of service 
using a vector of revalorization coefficients, in order to obtain the pension base. It is 
actually an instrument in the pension system, used for obtaining horizontal equity between 
existing and new pensioners. Indexation of the pension, on the other hand, is a procedure 
of adjusting retirement benefits to existent economic developments in the country using a 
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complex set of rules, where consumer price index is the floor and wage index is the ceiling 
for the growth rate of pensions. 
 
  It has to be emphasized that in 2005 the Government of the Republic of Slovenia 
introduced several changes to the 1999 PDIA that were aimed at increasing the pensions 
(in real terms). The most important among then was the introduction of full indexation of 
pensions that is being carried out twice a year (in February and in November). 
Additionally, the changes of pension legislation include increases in the level of 
pensioner’s recreation grant and lowering eligibility requirements of the widower’s 
pension. These provisions, especially the introduction of full indexation of pensions, will 
undoubtedly have substantial negative long-term effects on controlling the expenditure of 
the system of public finances. 
 
  The 1999 PDIA introduced a number of elements that improved horizontal equity 
in the system (cf. Stanovnik 2002). The gender divide regarding eligibility and benefits 
was considerably narrowed. Not only were accrual rates equalized, but the eligibility 
criteria for women are now closer to those for men. Nonetheless, even greater emphasis 
was laid on the principle of vertical equity or “solidarity”. Thus the ratio between two 
comparable pensions2 can not exceed 4:1, which is less than the prior ratio of 4.8:1 (1992 
PDIA). Instead of explicit minimum and maximum pension, the Slovenian pension system 
includes minimum and maximum pension base; the former is set nominally, yet amounted 
to approximately 62.5 per cent of average net wage in 2000, while the latter is four times 
the minimum pension base. A further redistributive element lies in the fact that social 
security contributions are not capped. 
 
  Another very important innovation of the 1999 pension legislation is the adjustment 
of pension growth of the existing pensioners to entry pensions of new pensioners, which 
amounts approximately to –0.6 percentage points per annum. This means that pensions of 
existing pensioners are being decreased, taking account of the lower pensions of new 
entrants. There was an initiative given to the Institutional Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia for constitutional review of this article, but the Court ruled in December 2003 that 
the article is congruent with the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. Such outcome is 
particularly important, since this modification of the pension legislation represent a large 
share of overall effects of the pension reform and has also a significant positive effect on 
managing expenditure of the pension system. 
                                                 
2 Comparable pensions exist when two pensioners enter the pension system under the same conditions and 
both have full pension qualifying period. 
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  The 1999 PDIA enabled the development of supplementary pension saving within 
the second pillar. In Slovenia the second pillar comprises supplementary pension 
insurance, which can be broken down to: (1) individual and collective, (2) voluntary and 
mandatory, and (3) based on employee or employer payments. Following significant 
consolidation on the pensions market in the first half of this decade, the first and third 
classification can be taken as practically the same and one can speak of individual 
supplementary pension insurance as insurance based on employee payments, and 
collective supplementary pension insurance as insurance based on employer payments. 
Distinguishing between whether participation is mandatory and the type of scheme is 
somewhat more difficult; individual supplementary pension insurance is voluntary, while 
collective supplementary insurance may be mandatory or voluntary. 
 
  According to the current pension legislation, the second pillar includes insurance 
companies and pension companies as well as the state. It covers private professional 
schemes financed from employee contributions and their employers. Participation in the 
first pillar is a condition for inclusion in the second pillar. The investment financing system 
represents the collection of funds in personal pension accounts with the purpose of 
providing the insured persons with an additional pension on reaching a set age, or in other 
cases defined in the pension scheme. Monthly contributions gain interest at an agreed rate, 
or based on the profit the fund manager generates from investments. There is a minimum 
return requirement for pension funds, requiring them to provide at least 40% of the average 
annual interest rate on long-term government bonds. 
 
  Insured persons participating in voluntary supplementary pension insurance can 
claim tax relief, if the pension scheme is on the approved list at the Ministry of Labour, 
Family and Social Affairs. According to the Act, value added tax is not paid on premia, 
and they are also exempt of 6.5% of insurance service tax. The tax relief on a premium 
paid by an insured person works by reducing the personal income tax base by the amount 
the insured person paid for voluntary supplementary pension insurance. However, the 
reduction of the personal income tax base is limited. The premium an employer pays for an 
insured person is not counted in that person’s income tax base. The pension is included in 
the income tax base in the year in which the beneficiary receives payment of the pension, 
while premium paid by the employer is recognised for tax relief on corporate income tax, 
but they do not count as wages paid nor are contributions paid on them. Experience to date 
with collective schemes indicates that employers finance most of the premium or even the 
entire premium. 
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  The pension scheme manager is eligible for reimbursement of input costs from 
premia paid, output costs and to an annual management commission. The input costs are 
calculated as a percentage of the paid premium, and reduce the paid premium. The output 
costs are calculated as a percentage of the surrender value, and reduce the surrender value. 
The commission for managing an active fund is defined as a percentage of the average net 
annual value of mutual fund assets and reduces the fund’s actual return. The Minister of 
Finance prescribes the maximum permitted percentages for these costs; at present these 
stand at 5.5% for input costs; output costs at 1%, and the management commission at 
1.5%. Administrative costs are high therefore, though the trend is for them to fall. 
 
  The second pillar of the Slovenian pension system has undoubtedly undergone 
considerable growth, as in mid-2006 over half the active working population was already 
included in voluntary pension insurance. However, most of these insured persons were 
involved via collective insurance, while the individual pension saving segment is marginal. 
Civil servants represent a significant proportion, though they pay the minimum premium. 
On 1 November 2005 439,280 insured persons were included in supplementary pension 
insurance, but 167,363 of them were civil servants with a minimum pension insurance 
premium. Overall, the key worrying indicator of progress in supplementary pension 
insurance in Slovenia is the value of paid premia. As this analysis indicates, there is a large 
gap between the actually paid premium for supplementary pension insurance and the target 
premium value that would enable compensation of effects of the pension reform on the 
welfare of the elderly. Below the article will present the consequences this problem may 
present in future. 
 
Results of the OLG-GE Simulations 
 
  The groundwork for our analysis is execution of dynamic calibration of the OLG-
GE model and consequently preparation of the pertinent reference solution. In the 
framework of performing dynamic calibration of the model SIOLG 2.0, we follow the 
strategy of using the model to generate the entire dynamic path of endogenous variables in 
order to accurately reproduce the values of every endogenous variable in the base year 
(2000). The dynamic calibration scenario described herein simultaneously represents the 
benchmark scenario (BENCH), referring to steady-state growth of all relevant variables in 
the model. The reference scenario (REFER) is then obtained by solving the model with 
implemented both demographic and pension block, where additional deficit3 of the state 
                                                 
3 Additional deficit is the excess of the state pension fund deficit in a particular year over its value in the base 
year, when it amounted to 3.9 per cent of the GDP. 
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pension fund at changed demographic structure is being financed from the central 
government budget with revenues from value-added tax. Alternatively, the additional 
deficit could have been financed with revenues from labour income tax. The initial (base-
year) IPDI deficit is of course being funded by pension contributions. The level of 
supplementary pension saving in the second pillar remains unchanged. The reference 
scenario represents the basis for comparison of consequences of a range of economic 
policies in the system of public finances. 
 
  Analysis of the Slovenian economy, where we take into account upcoming 
developments of the Slovenian pension system, is then performed by forming 
counterfactual scenarios and comparing their outcomes to the results of the reference 
scenario. First, we distinguish counterfactual scenarios with respect to the level of 
supplementary pension saving. This entails defining the concept of the total pension 
received by the insured person on retirement. This may be the same sum as the pension 
from the currently applicable mandatory pension insurance system and pension from the 
existing low savings in the second pillar, or may – with an appropriately defined 
mandatory second pillar saving – compensate either the overall effects on mandatory 
pension insurance of the 1999 pension reform, or only for the key changes ushered into the 
Slovenian pension system in 2005. The reference scenario and the first counterfactual 
scenario, therefore, only model the voluntary second pillar, while the final two 
counterfactual scenarios model the mandatory second pillar in relation to the level of the 
target total pension. 
 
 Furthermore, we distinguish two counterfactual scenarios with respect to the means 
of financing the first pension pillar. Whereas the reference scenario refers to the present 
structure of financing the pension system, where only the additional deficit is being 
financed with revenues from value-added tax, these counterfactual scenarios are different. 
Namely, in the first counterfactual scenario (VAT) we assume that the entire state pension 
fund is financed with revenues from value-added tax, while in the second counterfactual 
scenario (LABS) the IPDI is by assumption funded exclusively with revenues from labour 
income tax. These scenarios are used in order to represent the effects of two extreme 
approaches to funding the pension system and to demonstrate their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
  Unless explicitly stated otherwise, steady-state growth rate of 2.5 per cent and 
medium variant of demographic projections are used for OLG-GE simulations. The GDP 
growth is endogenously determined, while the productivity growth is exogenous and equal 
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to the chosen steady-state growth. Wage growth follows the productivity growth, but is 
also dependent on changes in labour supply. The pension block of the model SIOLG 2.0 
follows the 1999 PDIA and its subsequent changes with the following key elements: (1) 
pension as proportion of the pension base is gradually decreasing for new and existing 
pensioners to 72.5 per cent; (2) number of consecutive years of service for calculation of 
the pension base is gradually increasing from 10 to 18; (3) eligibility criteria for retirement 
are being raised, to be reflected in estimated increase in average retirement age of 2 years 
for men and 4 years for women (retirement age of 60 years for both men and women); (4) 
average pension growth reaches 100 per cent of average wage growth (full indexation of 
pensions); (5) calculation of the revalorization coefficients is based on lagging of pension 
growth behind wage growth, which enables equalizing the financial situation among 
existing and new pensioners; and (6) growth of residual non-pension expenditure of the 
IPDI follows population growth and exogenous productivity growth. 
 
  We commence by analyzing supplementary pension saving in Slovenia, followed 
by an analysis of welfare effects in Slovenia and an analysis of macroeconomic effects of 
the Slovenian pension reform, whilst the chapter is being concluded by analyzing effects of 
the IPDI deficit on sustainability of Slovenian public finances. 
 
An Analysis of Supplementary Pension Saving in Slovenia 
 
  The level of savings required in the mandatory second pillar depends primarily on 
the amount of the target total pension, which comprises the pension from the mandatory 
pension insurance (first pillar) and the pension from the supplementary pension insurance 
(second pillar), and on mandatory pension insurance parameters. Within the latter, one 
should put out the retirement age and the wage indexation of pensions from mandatory 
pension insurance. A distinction must be made between saving in the second pillar, which 
is required to compensate for the overall effects of the 1999 pension reform (which only 
came into effect from 2000) on mandatory pension insurance, and saving in the second 
pillar which is only required to compensate for key changes in the pension system as of 
2005 (coming into effect in that same year). Both are defined in the model by the 
proportion of the net wage allocated to saving in the second pillar of the pension system. 
 
  Figure 1, which relates to the retirement age of 60 years and full wage indexation 
of pensions, indicates that second pillar saving required to achieve the given target total 
pension is falling along with reduction in household age, while it remains stable in the base 
period, and is constant for new generations of household. This is to be expected given the 
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assumptions in the model (households start saving in the second pension pillar in 2000) 
that older generations have less time to compensate for the effects of the pension reform 
with additional pension saving, hence making the required saving level higher. 
Compensating for the total effects of the pension reform requires a higher level of savings 
that compensating for the changes in pension legislation alone, so the first liquidity 
constraint curve lies above the second. The saving required for the new generation to 
compensate for the total effects of the pension reform is 8.48% of the net wage, while 
compensating for the changes in the pension legislation from 2005 would require savings 
of 4.97% of the net wage. The reference saving in the second pillar is very low in Slovenia, 
which is in accordance with the supplementary pension insurance profiles constructed for 
Slovenia (Verbič, 2007, pp. 214-221). 
 
 
Figure 1. Supplementary pension savings required in order to keep the total pension at the 
given level (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
  Figure 2 indicates the changes required in second pillar saving by age cohort to 
achieve the required target total pension when raising the retirement age by five years, 
while retaining full wage indexation. It can be ascertained that the development of both 
liquidity constraint curves is similar to the preceding case, while the required saving level 
to achieve the given target full pension is significantly lower. Therefore, the saving 
required for the new generation to compensate for the total effects of the pension reform is 
5.82% of the net wage, while compensating for the changes in the pension legislation from 
2005 requires savings of 3.54% of the net wage. Increasing the retirement age by an 
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additional year therefore reduces the additional second pillar saving required to achieve the 
given target pension by 0.4 percentage points of the net wage. 
 
 
Figure 2. Expected change in the supplementary pension savings required in order to keep 
the total pension at the given level in case of increasing retirement age to 65 
years and unchanged indexation of pensions 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
An Analysis of Welfare Effects in Slovenia 
 
For the purpose of welfare analysis we use the Hicks’s equivalent variations (HEV) as a 
measure of change in the welfare of generations. Equivalent variations can be defined as 
the equivalent percentage change in full lifetime resources needed in the reference scenario 
to produce the same level of welfare under the counterfactual scenarios. A positive value 
means that a generation will gain from switching from the reference scenario to the 
counterfactual scenario. The inter-generational redistribution effects for the current pension 
system parameter values in Slovenia, i.e. retirement age of 60 years and full (100 per cent) 
indexation of pensions, are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Welfare effects in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing the 
pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
  A first glance at the Figure 3 shows that in case of funding the pension system with 
revenues from value-added tax, the future generations would gain. It is obvious that in this 
scenario the elderly would lose, as they have to pay more value-added tax in comparison 
with the reference scenario; they would be forced to bear a larger burden of the present 
value of public expenditure. In case of funding the pension system with revenues from 
labour income tax, all future generations would lose, as they alone would need to bear the 
burden of public expenditure. 
 
  Funding of the pension system with revenues from value-added tax appears to be 
somewhat better alternative than funding of the pension system with pension contributions, 
which can be explained as follows. Replacement of social security contributions with 
revenues from value-added tax improves financial situation of young generations for the 
consumption of the elderly is being taxed additionally. Since young generations have lower 
marginal propensity to consume compared to the elderly, after the tax reform their 
consumption decreases, whilst their supply of labour has to increase. Total consumption 
therefore decreases, whereas the total labour supply increases; savings increase and higher 
capital stock leads to higher GDP. 
 
  As value-added tax rate is raised over time, making consumption in the future more 
expensive, the value-added tax acts like a capital income tax. In case of funding the 
pension system with revenues from value-added tax, there is a substantial increase in 
labour supply. This is to a lesser extent also true in case of funding the pension system with 
revenues from labour income tax. People will not only work more, they will also work 
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longer. The retired generations suddenly have to pay an increased tax on their 
consumption. As they live on their savings, the only way to keep their consumption at 
unchanged level is by providing additional labour to the labour market, i.e. by retiring 
later. Correspondingly, a raising labour income tax rate will change the relative 
intertemporal prices of leisure. The future price of leisure will fall relatively to the price of 
current leisure, inducing a substitution of future for current labour supply. 
 
  Now consider the impact of introducing a mandatory second pension pillar on the 
welfare of individual generations in Slovenia. Figure 4 indicates the intergenerational 
distribution effects in case of keeping the target total pension at the level before the 
changes in the pension system in 2005 came into effect (i.e. before 30 July 2005). It can be 
seen that the effects on welfare of financing the pension system with revenues from values 
added tax would be less favourable in comparison with the scenario with a total pension 
based on the existing reform. This holds for younger and future generations, as well as for 
older generations (compare Figure 4 with Figure 3). Namely, since the increase in 
aggregate saving is now higher due to the supplementary pension saving, consumption 
would decrease further or the labour supply would increase more than in the scenario of 
total pension based on the existing pension reform. In case of financial the pension system 
with revenues from labour income tax, the effects on welfare would also be somewhat less 
favourable compared to the scenario of total pension based on the existing pension reform. 
The reduction in aggregate saving would now be lover or the aggregate saving may even 
increase due to the supplementary pension saving, which in each case leads to a reverse 
trend in the dynamics of real consumption (decrease) and labour supply (increase). 
 
Figure 4. Welfare effects in Slovenia in case of introducing mandatory supplementary 
pension savings and applying different sources of financing the pension system 
(retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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  In the group of scenarios that maintain the total pension at the level before the 
pension reform or its amendments came into effect, the additional gap in the welfare of 
older generations that are still active, evident in Figure 4, is a consequence of the 
assumption of the model, according to which these generations only start to compensate for 
the effect of the pension reform from 2000, and manage to do so despite the small 
proportion of their active working period remaining. 
 
  Another important aspect of the reform is its overall efficiency effect. In order to 
obtain this effect, we have changed the model in such a way that there are no inter-
generational effects; all generations lose or gain the same amount. This is accomplished by 
introducing a lump-sum redistribution authority (LSRA), which redistributes gains and 
losses evenly among the generations using lump-sum transfers. These transfers have no 
distortional effects; hence what remains is the pure efficiency effect of the tax reform. As 
can be seen in Table 1, there is a positive overall efficiency effect in case of funding the 
pension system with revenues from value-added tax, i.e. the welfare level of all generations 
increases by 0.29-0.35 per cent. In contrast, the overall efficiency effect in case of funding 
the pension system with revenues from labour income tax is negative; the welfare level of 
all generations decreases by 0.12-0.74 per cent. 
 
 
Table 1. Overall effect on efficiency (LSRA) given different methods of financing the 
pension deficit, different retirement ages, and different levels of indexation 
Scenario determination  Efficiency effect (LSRA) 
Retirement age  Indexation level  VAT vs. REFER LABS vs. REFER 
100 per cent indexation  0.29% –0.74% 60 years 
80 per cent indexation  0.35% –0.51% 
100 per cent indexation  0.29% –0.22% 65 years 80 per cent indexation  0.34% –0.12% 
 
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
  When calculating the average value of the total LSRA effect for the scenario group 
with total pension based on existing reforms (i.e. for the entire Table 1), and comparing the 
value acquired with the value for the scenario group that retains the total pension at the 
level before the 2005 amendments of the pension reform came into effect and with the 
value for the scenario group that retains the total pension at the level before the 1999 
pension reform came into effect, one finds that in the first case the welfare level of all 
generations would decrease by 0.24 percentage points, and in the second case by 1.27 
percentage points. Since by introducing mandatory supplementary pension savings the 
households become liquidity constrained (at least in some periods of life), their total level 
of welfare would decrease somewhat, as expected. 
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An Analysis of Macroeconomic Effects of the Slovenian Pension Reform 
 
 Based on developed scenarios, it can be established that the choice of source of 
financing pensions does not have a significant effect on GDP growth and thus on GDP 
level. Namely, neither the annual growth rate in case of financing the pension system with 
revenues from value-added tax nor the annual growth rate in case of financing the pension 
system with revenues from labour income tax differ much from the annual growth rate of 
the GDP in the reference scenario, as can be seen from Figure 5 for the current pension 
system parameter values in Slovenia, i.e. retirement age of 60 years and full indexation of 
pensions. One should bear in mind that in the benchmark scenario, i.e. in the case with 
highest GDP growth (see Figure 5), unfavourable demographic developments are not 
implemented, and thus the differences between the benchmark scenario and other three 
scenarios clearly demonstrate the demographic slowdown of GDP growth. 
 
Figure 5. Expected gross domestic product in Slovenia in case of applying different 
sources of financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full 
indexation) 
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Note: The base year (2000) is not fixed in the model, because this would lead to too many additional 
restrictions on the model, i.e. it would increase its complexity significantly, and indirectly make the 
model less solvable. As a consequence of this fact the changes to economic variables occur already in 
the year 2000. The problem that arised is being ‘solved’ by fixing the (pre)model year of 1995. 
 
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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  The effects of funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax and 
with revenues from labour income tax on consumption, investment (savings4) and capital 
stock can be ascertained from Figures 6 and 7. Increase in the value-added tax rate makes 
consumption more expensive and therefore encourages households to reduce their present 
consumption (see Figure 6), and increase savings and therefore investment (Figure 7). This 
consequently increases the capital stock and raises the level of possible future 
consumption. Increase in the labour income tax rate, on the other hand, increases the price 
of present compared to future leisure, inducing substitution of future for current labour 
supply. The latter therefore decreases. In order to maintain the present level of 
consumption (see the long-term trend on Figure 6), households decrease current savings, 
thus decreasing investment (Figure 7). This has an effect of decreasing the capital stock, 
though it can potentially also represent an increase in the level of future consumption. 
 
 
Figure 6. Expected real consumption in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
                                                 
4  Since general equilibrium theory is acknowledged as a version of the neoclassical theory, in an OLG-GE 
model effects on investment are also effects on savings. 
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Figure 7. Expected real investments in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
   
   
 
  The real interest rate changes can easily be explained by the effects of different 
scenarios on the capital stock (see Figure 8). In case of funding the pension system with 
revenues from value-added tax, the capital stock grows by more than in the reference case 
(Figure 8), which alone leads to a substantial fall in the real interest rate. This should be 
kept in mind as the second pillar, which is a fully-funded system in Slovenia, is expected to 
become of more importance in the following decades. In case of funding the pension 
system with revenues from labour income tax, on the other hand, the capital stock grows 
by less than in the reference case (see Figure 8), which leads to a somewhat higher real 
interest rate in the long run. 
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Figure 8. Expected real interest rate in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
  In case of funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax, an 
important initial decline of real wages would arise (see Figure 9) due to necessary increase 
in the value-added tax rate and resulting raise in consumer prices. To keep unchanged level 
of consumption, economic agents need to increase their labour supply, hence the 
employment also increases (see Figure 10). Due to anticipated unfavourable demographic 
developments and consequential decrease in the number of active population, the labour 
supply and production factor prices would then adjust accordingly. Thus the real wages in 
case of funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax are anticipated to 
gradually increase (after the initial decrease), as a consequence of gradual lessening of 
growth of consumer prices and accompanying increasing of labour costs. Changes in 
production factor prices would cause rising employment to settle down at somewhat higher 
level in comparison with the reference case. 
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Figure 9. Expected real wages in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
Figure 10. Expected employment in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
  In case of funding the pension system with revenues from labour income tax, 
increases of labour income tax rate would, as already said, alter the intertemporal price of 
leisure. The future price of leisure would decrease in comparison with the present price of 
leisure, resulting in substitution of future labour supply for present labour supply. 
Employment would consequently decrease (see Figure 10). The additional increase of 
 23
labour income tax rate, needed to cover the IPDI deficit, would lead to additional reduction 
in the level of employment, while at the same time consumer prices would decrease in 
comparison with consumer prices in the reference case, resulting in rising real wages in 
comparison with real wages in the reference case (see Figure 9). The latter is certainly also 
a consequence of increasing labour costs due to declining number of active population. 
 
 Now consider the impact of introducing a mandatory second pension pillar on 
macroeconomic variables of the Slovenian economy. The increased saving leads to 
complex reciprocal effects within the economy between sources and consequences of 
economic activity. Despite the fact that this form of saving is not voluntary, additional 
sources of income to reach the target level of savings must be found and be as optimal as 
possible (with respect to the additional liquidity constraint incorporated into the model). If 
one assumes that any additional economic growth would be insufficient, nor would it 
appear immediately, households could reduce their current consumption or increase their 
labour supply (dedicating a larger proportion of their labour endowment to labour at the 
expense of leisure). On the other hand, the greater accumulation of savings leads to higher 
investment, high capital stock and, finally, plausibly higher economic growth and higher 
potential future consumption as well. 
 
  As indicated by Figure 11, the supplementary saving required due to the 
introduction of mandatory supplementary pension insurance reduces real household 
consumption compared to the scenario with only the minor existing (reference) second 
pension pillar (See Figure 6). Figure 12 indicates that this also leads to growth in 
household labour supply compared to the scenario with just the reference second pension 
pillar (see Figure 10). The growth in labour supply is initially considerable (on introduction 
of the mandatory second pension pillar), and then decreases before stabilising in the long 
term. The large initial growth in labour supply is related to the assumption in the model 
that households start to save within the second pension pillar in 2000. Subsequently, 
demographic trends come to the fore that reduce the size of the active population and by 
increasing labour costs (see Figure 9) compensate for the quantitative reduction of labour 
in the value of labour. 
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Figure 11. Expected change in real consumption in Slovenia due to supplementary second 
pension pillar saving (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
Figure 12. Expected change in employment in Slovenia due to supplementary second 
pension pillar saving (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
  On the hand, as stated above, the increased volume of saving facilitates an increase 
of real investment, as indicated in Figure 13. In comparison with the scenario with just the 
reference second pension pillar (see Figure 7), real investment first grows heavily (on the 
introduction of the mandatory second pension pillar), and then rapidly stabilises, 
maintaining low long-term growth compared to the reference scenario excluding the 
mandatory second pillar. The reason for this dynamics can again be found in the 
assumption of the model, according to which households save within the second pension 
insurance pillar from 2000 onwards. As a consequence, the capital stock follows a similar 
dynamics, only with a lag of one model time period (five years). It may further be stated 
that the growth of investment and capital stock is favoured by a fall in real interest rate, 
which is indeed small and stabilises in the long term at 0.15 percentage points. 
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Figure 13. Expected change in real investment in Slovenia due to supplementary second 
pension pillar saving (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
  Finally, Figure 14 indicates that increased investment leads to somewhat higher 
long-term growth of real GDP compared to the scenario with just the reference second 
pension pillar (see Figure 5). The additional growth is initially significant (on introduction 
of the mandatory second pension pillar), but then immediately becomes negative in the 
following period. This is understandable, since at the introduction of the mandatory second 
pillar the initial shock due to growth in real investment caused by the additional saving is 
so large that it compensates for the fall in real consumption (see Figures 11 and 13). The 
economy then requires some time to make use of the additional capital stock generated by 
the additional investments. The effects of the demographic slowdown of real GDP must 
also be taken into account. 
 
Figure 14. Expected change in real GDP in Slovenia due to supplementary second 
pension pillar saving (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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An Analysis of Effects of the Pension Fund Deficit on Sustainability of Slovenian Public 
Finances 
 
 The model simulations indicate that in case of the current situation in the pension 
system, i.e. given retirement age of 60 years and full indexation of pensions with respect to 
wages, the additional IPDI deficit would grow to between 10% and 12% of GDP by 2040, 
given the scenario applied (see Figure 15). The significantly higher deficit seen in the 
scenario where the public pension system is financed with revenues from labour income 
tax is a consequence of growth of real wages and of a lower rate of GDP growth, compared 
to the reference scenario. To understand the dimensions of the forecast growth in pension 
expenditure, it is sufficient to mention the fact that over the period 1947 to 1951, when the 
pension system started functioning, the total proportion of the IPDI’s funds in GDP was 
just 2.5% (Stanovnik and Kukar, 1995). Meanwhile, at the beginning of the 1990s, due to a 
drastic fall in the number of employees and the subsequent steep rise in pensioners, 
pension expenditure had already passed the 10% of GDP milestone, with the figure settling 
at around 13% of GDP following the implementation of the 1999 pension reform. 
 
 
Figure 15. Additional deficit of the Slovenian state pension fund in case of applying 
different sources of financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years 
and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
  At last, we are interested in the impact of a mandatory second pension pillar on the 
first pillar, i.e. the effect on the balance of cash flows of the IPDI. If employees increase 
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second pillar saving, the value of their labour supply has to increase or they have to reduce 
the value of their current consumption. If the first option is selected, their gross income 
from the employment on which social insurance contributions (including pension and 
disability insurance contributions) are paid will increase, which could lead to a reduction in 
the IPDI deficit. As indicated by Figure 16, keeping the target full pension at the level 
before the 1999 pension reform came into effect would actually lead to this phenomenon. 
The pension fund deficit would be reduced due to the participation of employees in a 
(target) mandatory second pillar by between 0.80 and 1.74 GDP percentage points, 
depending on the year selected. On the other hand, in case of keeping the target full 
pension at the level before the 2005 changes of the pension reform were implemented, the 
pension fund deficit would be reduced merely by between 0.58 and 0.75 GDP percentage 
points, depending on the year selected. 
 
 
Figure 16. Expected change in the deficit of the Slovenian state pension fund in case of 
supplementary pension savings in the second pillar keeping the total pension at 
the 2000 level 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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Figure 17. Expected change in the deficit of the Slovenian state pension fund in case of 
supplementary pension savings in the second pillar keeping the total pension at 
the 2005 level 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The article presents an analysis of supplementary pension insurance in Slovenia and 
its subsequent effects on welfare in Slovenia, macroeconomic variables of the Slovenian 
economy and the pension fund deficit. Thus a dynamic OLG general equilibrium model 
was constructed, which enables analysis of intra-generational and inter-generational 
redistribution effects of different strategies of public financing in order to achieve 
sustainable economic growth. Different scenarios were then prepared and analyzed with 
the model SIOLG 2.0 in order to fulfil our goal. 
 
  It has been established that the volume of current second pillar saving in Slovenia is 
too low to compensate for the reduction in the mandatory pension insurance rights. It is not 
only the fact that participation in the second pension pillar is too low, but especially the 
premia paid in are too low. The model simulations indicated that in case of retirement age 
of 60 the saving required for the new generations to compensate for the total effects of the 
pension reform is approximately 8.5% of the net wage, while the changes in the pension 
legislation from 2005 can be compensated by savings of approximately 5.0% of the net 
wage. The reference (voluntary) second pillar saving of the present new generations 
amounts to approximately 0.4% of the net wage on average. 
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  The burden of introducing the 1999 pension reform and its amendments will largely 
be born by the young active generations and future generations on behalf of already retired 
generations and the baby boom generations that are starting to retire. Due to a fall in the 
replacement rate and the effect of incomplete pension indexation with respect to wages 
between 2000 and 2005 on one hand, but primarily due to growth in the dependency ratio 
as a consequence of demographic aging on the other hand, the younger existing and new 
generations will have to pay higher contributions for the same or a lower pension, while to 
compensate for welfare from supplementary pension insurance they will have to reduce 
current consumption or increase their labour supply. The effect of current second pillar 
saving on welfare is practically negligible, while a higher level of second pillar saving 
would have a greater effect on welfare. The intergenerational distribution of welfare 
depends on the target that the introduction of mandatory supplementary pension saving 
would be intended to meet. 
 
  The macroeconomic consequences of introducing a mandatory fully-funded 
component of pension insurance would be positive or at least not negative. Increased 
pension saving reduces current consumption and increases the labour supply of active 
generations, but also increases the volume of savings available, so the increased investment 
may increase capital reserves and production, which leads to an increase in economic 
growth and potential future consumption. The model simulations indeed indicated that 
increased investment would lead to somewhat higher long-term growth of GDP, compared 
to the scenario with just the reference second pension pillar. The additional growth is 
initially significant (on introduction of the mandatory second pension pillar), but then 
immediately becomes negative in the following period. This is understandable, since at the 
introduction of the mandatory second pillar the initial shock due to growth in real 
investment caused by the additional saving is so large that it compensates for the fall in 
real consumption (see Figures 11 and 13). The economy then requires some time to make 
use of the additional capital stock generated by the additional investments. 
 
  It may further be stated that the growth of investment and capital stock is favoured 
by a fall in real interest rate, which stabilises in the long term at a relatively low value. 
Alongside all the above, one must also take into account the effects of the demographic 
slowdown of real GDP, and the effects of the demographic reduction of the active 
population on future labour cost growth. Mandatory supplementary saving indeed reduces 
the consumption and welfare of young generations due to the liquidity constraint, however, 
the welfare and potential consumption increases later in the life cycle for these generations. 
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  One can conclude with the finding that alternative forms of old-age saving are not 
developing quickly enough to successfully deal in the long term with the problems of an 
aging population, therefore Slovenia will require additional measures at a number of levels 
to normalise the state of the pension system. The 1999 PDIA introduced incentives for 
retirement saving in funded systems, which could be subject to modifications. Another 
possible solution to deteriorating economic circumstances of the elderly could be to reduce 
the difference between the minimum and maximum pension base by raising the former and 
reducing the latter. This would enable insured persons from lower income brackets and 
compel insured persons from middle and higher income brackets in Slovenia to save 
“voluntarily” for retirement in the context of the second pension pillar. Ultimately, 
mandatory (legally binding) supplementary pension insurance would assist in the move 
towards a more rational reallocation of life-cycle consumption and a more optimal labour 
supply. The consequent increased activity of insured persons would also lead to a greater 
volume of contributions for mandatory pension insurance, which would reduce the public 
pension fund deficit. 
 
 
References 
 
Armington, P. S. 1969. “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production.” 
IMF Staff Paper no. 16. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Arrow, K. J., and G. Debreu. 1954. “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy.” 
Econometrica 22, no. 3: 265-290. 
Auerbach, A. J., and L. J. Kotlikoff. 1987. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Balistreri, E. J., and R. H. Hillberry. 2003. “Estibration: An Illustration of Structural Estimation as 
Calibration.” Mimeo. Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO. 
Böhringer, C., T. F. Rutherford, and W. Wiegard. 2003. “Computable General Equilibrium Analysis: 
Opening a Black Box.” Discussion Paper no. 56. Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim. 
Brooke, A., D. Kendrick, A. Meeraus, and R. Raman. 1998. GAMS: A User's Guide. Washington, 
DC: GAMS Development Corporation. 
Deaton, A. 1992. Understanding Consumption. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
European Commission. 2001. Competitiveness and Social Cohesion: Implications for Candidate 
Countries. Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Ferris, M. C., and T. S. Munson. 2000. GAMS/PATH User Guide: Version 4.3. Washington, DC: 
GAMS Development Corporation. 
Friedman, M. 1957. A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Mathiesen, L. 1985. “Computation of Economic Equilibria by a Sequence of Linear Complementarity 
Problems.” In Economic Equilibrium: Model Formulation and Solution, ed. A. S. Manne, 144-
162. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 31
Modigliani, F., and R. Brumberg. 1954. “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An 
Interpretation of Cross-Section Data.” In Post Keynesian Economics, ed. K. K. Kurihara, 
388-436. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Modigliani, F. 1986. “Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations.” The American 
Economic Review 76, no. 3: 297-313. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2000. Reforms for an Ageing 
Society. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Rutherford, T. F. 1995. “Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functions: Some Hints and Useful 
Formulae.” Mimeo. University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. 
Rutherford, T. F. 1995a. “Extensions of GAMS for Complementarity Problems Arising in Applied 
Economic Analysis.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, no. 8: 1299-1324. 
Stanovnik, T., and S. Kukar. 1995. Medgeneracijski transferji dohodka v Sloveniji 
[Intergenerational Transfers of Income in Slovenia]. Ljubljana: Institute for Economic 
Research. 
Stanovnik, T. 2002. “The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Slovenia.” In Pension Reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Volume 2: Restructuring of Public Pension Schemes: Case 
Studies of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, ed. E. Fultz, 19-74. Budapest: International 
Labour Organization, Central and Eastern European Team. 
Stanovnik, T. 2004. “The Pension System of Slovenia after the 1999 Reform: Developments and 
Challenges.” Paper prepared for the tripartite conference Recent Developments in Pension 
Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe. International Labour Organization, Budapest. 
Verbič, M., B. Majcen and R. van Nieuwkoop. 2006. “Sustainability of the Slovenian Pension 
System: An Analysis with an Overlapping-generations General Equilibrium Model.” Eastern 
European Economics 44, no. 4: 60-81. 
Verbič, M. 2007. Dinamični model splošnega ravnovesja slovenskega gospodarstva s poudarkom 
na pokojninskem sistemu [A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of the Slovenian 
Economy with Emphasis on the Pension System]. Ljubljana: Institute for Economic 
Research. 
 32
